Start of Change Side Ought Not to Squander Opportunity for Breakthrough After Bill Clinton left Pyongyang with two freed U.S. journalists Wednesday, speculation is rampant on what he gave in return. Though billed as "the most influential private citizen in America," the former U.S. president's visit itself couldn't have been all some call "the most dangerous (North) Korean in the world" wanted in exchange for pardoning the imprisoned reporters. So it would be natural to presume there was some sort of "message" from President Barack Obama to North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, despite U.S. officials' "official" denial of it. Its content is anyone's guess for now, but could be known by the two countries' acts as time goes by. Nothing would be riskier than judging the encounter, between quite likely two of the world's toughest and most experienced strategists and negotiators, by appearances alone. Watching the seeming reversal of usual facial expressions between the two - the mostly glum Kim looking cheerful and the normally jovial Clinton appearing stiff - one could only guess Washington had to concede a major propaganda cover for Pyongyang in order to ensure the safety of its citizens. Kim Jong-il may have to thank the two women for offering him dear opportunities to discuss a breakthrough out of the current nuclear and missile stalemate with the U.S., demonstrate he is alive and well to audiences at home and abroad, and tell his people that no smaller a figure than a former U.S. president and the spouse of its secretary of state paid a courtesy call to the communist capital. The ailing North Korean leader must know, however, that for the temporary, propaganda prop to turn into any lasting, substantive benefit, the reclusive regime will have to be ready to make real changes toward denuclearization. Nothing less will bring about what Kim and his people want and need to get their country out of the looming economic decline and deepening diplomatic isolation. The first step for Pyongyang is to show its sincerity and credibility, as the U.S. has made it clear it would not reward North Korea if it returns to the dialogue table, nor if the North restarts from the Sept. 19, 2005 agreement, but would recognize Pyongyang's genuineness only when it progresses from where it had stopped. Even if North Korea agrees to resume dialogue, all related parties, including South Korea and China, have a long way to go before attainting a desired outcome, as they will have to undergo the tough, tedious process of resetting both the forms and procedures of the talks. That said, Washington and its allies ought not to misunderstand - or overestimate - their counterpart. In other words, they should not ask Pyongyang which way it will go regarding denuclearization. However incredible and unpredictable the isolationist regime might appear, North Korea's actions are also reactions to its adversaries. North Korea may not know where it would - or should - go, which can be decided by all six countries concerned. All parties involved can ill-afford to waste this opportunity to turn from confrontation to conversation. The key may not so much lie in Pyongyang as in Washington and Seoul. Particularly, the Lee Myung-bak administration, which has yet to rescue its citizen, detained in the North as long as the Americans, should deep this firmly in mind.